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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a new internationally comparable data set that permits an empirical
investigation of the effects of patent law on innovation.  The data have been constructed from the
catalogues of two 19th century world fairs: the Crystal Palace Exhibition in London, 1851, and the
Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia, 1876.  They include innovations that were not patented, as
well as those that were, and innovations from countries both with and without patent laws.  I find
no evidence that patent laws increased levels of innovative activity but strong evidence that patent
systems influenced the distribution of innovative activity across industries.  Inventors in countries
without patent laws concentrated in industries where secrecy was effective relative to patents, e.g.,
food processing and scientific instruments.  These results suggest that introducing strong and
effective patent laws in countries without patents may have stronger effects on changing the







Patent laws are designed to create the optimal incentives for innovation, yet we know little about 
exactly how these incentives work.  The need to better understand the effects of patent laws on 
innovation is particularly urgent today, as international agreements, such as those related to the 
1993 Trade Related International Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, are moving towards the 
harmonization of patent laws around the world.  Industrialized countries lobby to introduce 
patent laws in developing countries where such laws may not exist and to increase the duration 
of patent grants in countries where patent rights expire quickly.  While it is difficult to predict 
the results of such changes, historical data from the mid-nineteenth century may afford valuable 
lessons for patent policies today.  Patent laws that existed in the mid-nineteenth century had been 
adopted in a relatively ad-hoc manner, dependent more on legal traditions than economic 
considerations; governments had just begun to experiment with patent laws and large differences 
in patent systems existed across countries.  Patenting abroad was prohibitively expensive and 
almost all countries discriminated heavily against foreign patentees.  As a result, domestic patent 
laws played a more important role in creating the incentives for innovation than at any later stage 
in history. 
This paper introduces a new data set that reveals the effects of patent laws on innovation 
across a wide range of countries in 1851 and 1876.  I have constructed internationally 
comparable data on innovation from the exhibition catalogues for two nineteenth-century world 
fairs on technology: the Crystal Palace Exhibition in London in 1851 and the Centennial 
Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876.  The Crystal Palace was the most popular event of its age, 
and it became the first in a long series of world fairs which allowed inventors and firms to 
exchange technological information internationally.  More than six million visitors attended the 
Crystal Palace, and almost ten million visitors came to the Centennial Exhibition.  For the   2
Crystal Palace fair I have counted and classified 13,876 exhibits in 30 industries of use.  For the 
Centennial I have counted and classified more than 19,076 exhibits in 344 industries.  
A typical entry in the exhibition catalogue begins with the exhibitor’s name, address, and 
country of origin, followed by a brief description of the innovation, as well as some information 
about the exhibitor’s occupation and state of patent protection.  From these records, I have 
constructed data for 32,952 innovations, their industry of use, and country of origin.  I also 
determine whether exhibitors held a patent or not, distinguishing foreign from domestic patents.  
Information on domestic patents allows me to calculate proxies for patenting rates across 
industries.  In addition, I construct measures for the quality of innovations based on awards for 
inventiveness.  These awards ranked all exhibits according to their novelty and usefulness, and 
granted prizes to the most innovative exhibits. 
Exhibition data are particularly useful for studying the effects of patent laws on 
innovation because they measure economically useful innovation in a way that is independent of 
changes in patent laws.  As employed here, economically useful innovation—the commercial 
introduction of new or improved products and processes—is distinct from invention—the 
conception of such products and processes.  Exhibition data measure economically useful 
innovations, while patent data count those inventions which inventors chose to patent.  This 
distinction matters because only a fraction of innovations are patented and not all patents 
develop into economically useful innovations.  Historical records bear witness that national 
committees selected their most innovative products to be exhibited at the fairs.  Participation was 
competitive and a uniform system of selection admitted less than one third of all applicants to 
exhibit at the fairs.
1  Most importantly, exhibition data measure innovation independently from 
                                                           
1 Bericht (1852, 1853); Cole (1853); Rosenberg (1969); Curti (1950); Haltern (1971); Kroker (1975).    3
differences in domestic patent laws.
2  Exhibitors displayed innovations regardless of whether 
they could be patented at home, including many innovations which they had chosen not to 
patent. 
Exhibition data allow me to compare innovative activity across countries with and 
without patents.  This represents an empirical advance over the theoretical literature on patent 
laws which simply assumes that the existence of patent laws raises levels of innovation.  Without 
exhibition data, empirical studies of nineteenth-century patent laws relied on patent data, but 
these studies cannot identify whether the existence of patents raised levels of innovation.
3  
Equally important, they cannot identify whether the nature of innovation differs in countries 
without patent laws.
4  Nineteenth-century exhibition data allow me to analyze these questions 
empirically.
Previous studies of innovation have focused on the number of innovations that are 
created in an economy.  Among the key predictions in this literature, such as Nordhaus (1969), 
Klemperer (1990), and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), is that strong patent laws raise the number of 
innovations that are made within a country.  According to this argument, countries without 
patent laws should display few novel technologies.  In contrast, the exhibition data show that 
countries without patent laws brought many important innovations to the fairs.  Mid-nineteenth 
century Switzerland, for example, had the second highest number of exhibits per capita among 
all countries that visited the Crystal Palace Exhibition.  Moreover, exhibits from countries 
without patent laws received disproportionate shares of medals for outstanding innovations.  
                                                           
2 For the 19
th century, Coryton (1855) describes differences in what constitutes a patentable invention in Germany, 
Austria, Russia, and the U.S.  See Coryton (1855 pp. 235-264).   
3 Lanjouw and Cockburn (2000) describe comparable difficulties in using contemporary data for predicting the 
results of introducing pharmaceutical product patents to developing countries. 
4 The only information about innovation in countries without patent laws comes from patents that were granted 
abroad.  For the 19th century discrimination against foreign patentees creates bias in these data.   4
Countries without patent laws were exceptionally inventive in a couple of industries: food 
processing and the manufacture of scientific instruments. 
Previous studies have ignored the effects of patent laws on the direction of innovation, 
although the direction of innovation appears to be a key determinant of economic growth.  
Kuznets (1963) observes that technological innovation concentrates in a few fields at any given 
time; he argues that such concentrations determine countries’ potential for economic growth.  
Economic history supports these claims:  Germany’s focus on chemical innovations is widely 
understood to have enabled Germany to replace Britain as the industrial leader in the late 
nineteenth century.  Rosenberg (1972) argues that the United States overtook Europe at the 
beginning of the twentieth century because of its concentration on labor-saving innovations.   
This paper sets out to analyze the causes of such concentrations of innovative activity.  
More specifically, it asks the questions whether and how patent laws create or intensify a 
country’s tendency to focus innovation in certain industries.  A simple model predicts that weak 
patent laws encourage innovation in industries where alternative methods to protect intellectual 
property are particularly effective relative to patent protection.  By this argument, weak patent 
laws may help to create differences in technological comparative advantage among 
industrialized countries and their followers. 
Previous empirical analyses of the effects of patent laws had to rely almost exclusively 
on patent counts, despite some obvious limitations of these data.
5  Economic research benefits 
from data on mid-nineteenth-century innovations, because this period is uniquely suited to study 
the effects of patent laws.  At the time of the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851, most 
governments had adopted patent laws but they had not yet begun to modify these laws in   5
response to pressures from domestic interest groups.  Differences in domestic patent laws were 
large and mattered greatly to domestic inventors, because international treaties had not yet begun 
to harmonize patent laws or to protect the rights of foreign patentees.  However, nineteenth-
century patent data are available for less than a handful of countries.  Even within these 
countries, they omit entire industries because patent laws did not extend to all sectors of the 
economy.  In addition, many important nineteenth-century patents, such as various 
improvements in the steam engine, had to be dropped from patent counts, because they could not 
be assigned to a specific industry.   Patented inventions vary greatly in their commercial viability 
and quality; the quality of innovations is difficult to proxy based on patent data.  Most 
importantly, the way in which patents measure innovation varies with changes in patent laws.  
The definition of what constitutes a patentable invention varies across countries.  In the U.S. 
only first and true inventors are allowed to patent; in France first importers have equal access to 
exclusive patent rights.  Differences in the length of patent grants, in patent costs, and in the 
security of patent rights create further differences in what inventors choose to patent.
  I analyze 
these issues in a separate paper.  
Exhibition data offer a complement to nineteenth-century patent data which addresses 
many of the concerns about patent data.  Uniform rules of selecting exhibits ensure that exhibits 
are comparable across countries, regardless of domestic patent laws.  Exhibition data include 
information on three patentless countries: Switzerland and Denmark in 1851 and Switzerland 
and the Netherlands in 1876.  No other data are available to study early innovation in these 
countries.  Exhibition data cover innovations in all industries, including those that were excluded 
from the patent system.  Awards to the most innovative and useful exhibits provide a measure for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 See Gilfillan (1930) for an early use of patent data in international comparisons.  Schmookler (1962 and 1966) and   6
the quality of innovation.  References to patents in the exhibition data allow me to distinguish 
patented innovations from those that are protected by alternative mechanisms. 
The analysis of exhibition data suggests that patent laws may be an important factor in 
determining the direction of innovative activity.  Exhibition data show that countries without 
patents share an exceptionally strong focus on innovations in two industries: scientific 
instruments and food processing.  At the Crystal Palace, every fourth exhibit from a country 
without patent laws is a scientific instrument, while no more than one seventh of other countries’ 
innovations belong to this category.  At the same time, the patentless countries have significantly 
smaller shares of innovation in machinery, especially in machinery for manufacturing and 
agricultural machinery.  After the Netherlands abolished her patent system in 1869 for political 
reasons, the share of Dutch innovations that were devoted to food processing increased from 11 
to 37 percent. 
Proxies for differences in the propensity to patent across industries, which I have 
constructed from the Crystal Palace data, document that innovations in scientific instruments and 
food processing are less likely to be patented, especially compared to innovations in machinery.  
These proxies indicate that only 10 percent of exhibits in scientific instruments, but close to 40 
percent of exhibits in manufacturing machinery are patented.  Nineteenth-century sources report 
that secrecy was particularly effective at protecting innovations in scientific instruments and in 
food processing.  On the other hand, patenting was essential to protect and motivate innovations 
in machinery, especially for large-scale manufacturing.   
The remainder of this paper presents the results of using nineteenth-century exhibition 
data to study the effects of patent laws on innovation.  Section I summarizes the predictions and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Sokoloff (1988) employ US patents to show that invention responds to profit incentives.    7
findings of previous literature and outlines a model of the effects of patent laws on invention.  
Section II describes the exhibition data.  Section III presents empirical results based on 
exhibition data.  Section IV includes narrative evidence on the use of secrecy to protect 
intellectual property in the nineteenth century.  Section V discusses potential sources of bias in 
the exhibition data and section VI concludes. 
 
I.  Effects of Patent Laws on Innovation 
Patent laws are essential to the study of innovation because governments use them to 
create incentives for invention.  Surveys of individual inventors and firms, from the time of the 
Swiss Congress on Patent Protection in 1883 and Rossman (1931), have shown that most 
inventions result from deliberate research efforts, which respond positively to expected profits.  
Previous work, such as Nordhaus (1969), Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), 
suggests that patent protection is vital to expected profits because it determines the strength of an 
inventor’s intellectual property.
6   
This paper concentrates on the effects of two essential characteristics of patent systems: 
the existence of a patent system and patent length, the maximal duration of a patent grant.  
Among the many important features of patent systems, the length of a patent grant is especially 
important because it establishes how long inventors retain exclusive rights to their inventions.
7  
Moreover, patent length is relatively easy to measure and compare across countries; many other 
features of patent laws, such as patenting costs, patent breadth, or the enforceability of patents in 
a court of law are difficult to quantify and impossible to compare across countries, especially for 
                                                           
6 Results of the Swiss survey are reported in Procès-Verbal du Congres Suisse…(1883). 
7 Pakes (1986) examines the value of patent grants as options over future returns to inventions.  In the nineteenth 
century, most countries prevented this strategic use of patents by requiring that patents be put to practical use within 
one or two years. See also: Coryton (1855 pp. 265, 255).     8
the nineteenth century.
8  This paper examines the effect of patent laws on levels of innovation, 
but it also introduces a richer concept of innovation:  It addresses the question of how patent 
laws influence the direction of innovative activity. 
 
A.  Effects on the Number of Innovations  
The prevalent view in the literature is that patent laws raise levels of innovation and that 
increases in the length of patent grants encourage inventive activity.  Nordhaus (1969), 
Klemperer (1990), and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) assume that increases in patent length raise 
levels of innovation.
9  Baumol (1990) argues that R&D competes for the attention of talented 
individuals with other high-profile activities, such as political leadership, financial dealings, or 
manipulation of the legal system, which are often attempts at rent-seeking.  Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1991) emphasize three factors that influence talented individuals’ decisions whether 
to pursue activities that are socially productive: the size of the relevant market, the degree of 
diminishing returns, and the ability to keep the returns from one’s activities.  To the extent that 
patent grants increase the ability to keep the returns from innovation, they should raise levels of 
R&D activity in these views.  The following paragraphs check whether these assumptions in the 
literature – excluding the possibility of adopting foreign inventions and excluding alternative 
methods to protect intellectual property – would be consistent with the view that increases in 
patent laws raise levels of innovation. 
                                                           
8 The greatest costs of patenting are fees and the disclosure of patented inventions.  For American and British patent 
data from 1790 to 1850, Khan and Sokoloff (1998) show that patenting activity increases as patent fees decrease.  
Disclosure of the invention, which is a requirement under most patent systems, increases the costs of patenting as it 
decreases competitors’ costs to invent around the original invention.  The risks of disclosure decrease with increases 
in the probability that the property rights of the original patentee will be enforced in a court of law.  See Dutton 
(1984), Lanjouw (1994), and Khan (1995) for analyses of the effects of enforcement on innovation. 
9 In contrast, Scotchmer (1991) argues that increases in patent length may lower levels of innovation because 
increases in patent length reduce expected profits for future generations of inventors.   9
Consider a closed economy with two industries.  Each country has L potential inventors, 
where L may be regarded as the country’s labor force.  Countries differ in the characteristics of 
their patent systems, specifically the existence of a patent system and in the maximum duration, 
T, of a patent grant.  Within a country, inventors face identical patent fees and patent lengths in 
all industries.  To begin, I assume that patent protection is equally suitable to protect inventions 
in all industries.  
 
Inventors choose between two industries, which differ in the initial returns to invention, 
R, as well as in the speed at which inventions become obsolete.  For simplicity, I assume that 
development costs, which reduce initial returns R, include patenting costs, such as patent fees 
and time spent in researching prior art.  Suppose initial payoffs for patented inventions in the 
chemicals industry are Rc and initial payoffs in the machinery industry are Rm.  Initial payoffs to 
chemical inventions exceed those of machinery inventions, but inventions in chemicals become 
obsolete more quickly than inventions in machinery.  Let dc and dm represent the proportion of 
returns that carries over from one period to the next.
10  Then, the payoff to an innovation in 
chemicals at time t equals dc
t Rc and the payoff in machinery equals dm
t Rm where 0<dc<dm<1.  
There exists T′ ∈ N such that dc
t Rc≥ dm
t Rm for all t ≤ T′  and dc
tRc < dm
t Rm for all t > T′ .  For 
patent lengths below T′  the payoffs of innovations are higher in chemicals and for patent lengths 
beyond T′  the payoffs are higher in machinery.   
I assume that both industries experience decreasing returns to invention.  Each inventor 
picks the most promising project and with each choice the next best available project becomes 
                                                           
10 Schankerman and Pakes (1986) define di = (1-δ i)
-1 such that δ i represents the rate of obsolescence.  They discount 
future returns by (1+i)
-1.   0<di<1 may be interpreted as including discounting by the interest rate.    10
less valuable.
11  For simplicity I assume that the quality of projects declines at the same rate in 
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Equation (1) models the assumption that patent protection is the only means to profit from 
inventions.  Its right hand side expresses that the expected profits from invention are zero 
without patent laws.  
It is plausible that competition exists among inventors for the best innovation projects; 
the number of potential inventors exceeds the number of potential projects: Lj > Nj, where Nj 
represents the maximum number of invention projects in country j.  Potential inventors enter as 
long as the payoffs to invention are positive.  Entry reduces the maximum returns from invention 
until they are only slightly greater than patenting costs, C.
12  Then, 
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Equation (3) allows me to check the comparative static effects of an increase in patent 
length on levels of invention.  Taking first derivatives yields 
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11 This assumption follows Machlup (1962) who argues that inventors solve problems with tools available within a 
given framework of general knowledge.  Inventors are able to distinguish easy problems from hard problems and 
attack the easiest problems first.  As research effort increases, inventors pick projects that are less rewarding and the 
returns to research decrease.  
12 With a discrete number of invention projects, returns may not be strictly zero.   11
Equation (4) confirms that increases in the duration of patent grants increase the number 
of inventions.
13  Any decrease in patent length lowers the number of innovations.  By this 
reasoning, countries without patent laws should bring forth almost no new technologies. 
The assumption that all innovation originates from patentable domestic invention 
neglects important alternative sources of innovation.  First, it neglects the benefits of adopting 
foreign technologies: While the absence of patent laws lowers incentives for domestic invention, 
it facilitates the application of inventions that are made abroad.  If domestic firms can learn 
about foreign technologies, they can adopt these technologies without being blocked by foreign 
inventors and without having to pay licensing fees.  Schiff (1971) suggests that both Switzerland 
and the Netherlands benefited greatly from the adoption of foreign technologies when they did 
not have patent laws.  Then, the effects of introducing patent laws depend on the tradeoff 
between strengthening incentives for domestic invention and increasing the obstacles to adopting 
foreign technologies. 
 
B. Effects on the Direction of Innovation   
Previous literature on innovation has neglected the effects of patent laws on the direction 
of innovation – the focus of innovation on a specific set of industries and instead deals almost 
exclusively with effects on levels of innovation.
14  I argue that a richer concept of innovation is 
required to understand the effects of patent laws.  In addition to influencing levels of innovation, 
patent laws are very likely to influence the industrial composition of innovation, which in turn 
helps to determine a country’s potential for economic growth. 
                                                           
13 Similarly, increases in initial returns and decreases in patenting fees raise the number of inventions. 
14 Acemoglu (2002) examines the effects of price and market size on the bias in skill-levels of innovation.      12
Intuitively, the effects of patent laws vary across industries according to the relative 
importance of patent laws to protect inventions in these industries.  In a 1994 survey of 1,478 
American manufacturing firms, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) find that firms typically rely 
on a range of mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, lead time, and the use of complementary 
assets to capture profits from their innovations.  Of these mechanisms, patents are 
unambiguously the least important.  In contrast, secrecy, whereby inventors protect their 
intellectual property by preventing disclosure, appears to be emphasized most heavily.  The 
authors find patenting to be the most frequently used mechanism in two of 33 industries, while 
secrecy is the most used mechanism in 17 of 33 industries.
15   
Intuitively, the relative usefulness of patent grants should be inversely related to 
inventor’s ability to keep their innovations secret.  If patent laws require the disclosure of 
innovations, as they have done since their inception, applying for a patent grant is especially 
costly to innovations that are difficult to reverse-engineer, because disclosure raises the risk of 
imitation and even the safest patent expires at the end of the statutory term.  On the other hand, 
innovations which are easy to reverse-engineer benefit greatly from a patent grant, because 
disclosure is imminent with or without patenting, while a patent helps to secure intellectual 
property at least for a limited period. 
If the relative effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries, invention in 
countries without patent laws may be more likely to occur in industries where alternatives to 
patent protection can be used.  Then, countries without patent laws may have larger proportions 
of innovation in industries where patents are less effective relative to secrecy.  For instance, if 
food innovations in the nineteenth century were less suitable to patent protection than 
                                                           
15 See Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000 p.10).  See also Levin, Klevorick, and Nelson (1987) for a survey of 650   13
innovations in other industries, countries without patent laws should have higher shares of their 
innovations in foods.  At the same time, if innovations in machinery depended on patent 
protection, countries without patent laws would be less likely to devote significant portions of 
their innovative energies to machinery and may mechanize more slowly. 
In countries with patent laws, the inventor’s choice between patenting and secrecy 
represents a trade-off between certain protection for a finite period of time (through the patent) 
and uncertain protection to infinity (through secrecy).  I define s to be the share of inventions 
that remain secret after one year and suppose that s equals 1 for patented inventions.  Then (1-s) 
represents the risk of discovery that inventors incur if they choose not to patent their inventions.  
In period t they receive payoffs si
tRi without patent protection.  In industries where patenting is 
ineffective, payoffs from secrecy exceed payoffs from patenting when 
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This inequality implies that inventors are more likely to patent their inventions as patent 
length increases.  Inventions in industries where secrecy is effective become more attractive as 
patent length decreases.  If patent length equals zero, industries where a portion of inventions 
can be protected by secrecy become extremely lucrative to inventors relative to inventions in 
other industries.  Then countries without patent laws should have larger proportions of exhibits 
in industries where secrecy is effective. 
Similarly, the effects of increases in patent length should vary with the natural lifetime of 
innovations in each industry.  In industries where inventions remain valuable for many years 
after the end of the patent grants, increases in patent length would significantly raise expected 
profits from invention.  In contrast, if inventions are most lucrative in the first few years but 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
U.S. firms in 1983, and Harabi (1991) for a survey of 358 Swiss R&D labs.     14
become obsolete very quickly, expected payoffs should be insensitive to changes in the duration 
of patent grants.  Then, changes in patent length are likely to influence the distribution of 
innovation across industries, if patent grants are sufficiently short. 
With two industries, inventors choose industry c if the total returns in industry c exceed 
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Because the number of potential inventors L exceeds the number of potential invention projects 
N, inventors enter both industries until expected returns in both industries are nearly equal.  
Then, approximately  
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for 0<dc<dm<1 and g<1.  Equation (7) implies that invention shifts from industries with early 
payoffs to industries with later payoffs as patent length increases.  If patent life is short, 
industries with high initial payoffs are more attractive.  As patent life increases, the advantages 
of early payoffs decrease relative to payoffs that are long-lived.  Then, countries with long patent 
grants should have greater shares of their innovations in industries where the natural lifetime of 
inventions is long, and smaller shares in industries where inventions become obsolete more 
quickly.  
If the length of patent grants exceeds the natural life time of innovations, the effects of 
further increases in the length of patent grants may become quite small.  For European 
inventions in the second half of the nineteenth century, Schankerman and Pakes (1986) find that 
only ten percent of all patents survive for the whole statutory term.  In pre-1920 Germany, only   15
four percent survived for the statutory term of 15 years.  This suggests that, for countries with 
long patent grants, small changes in patent length may have only small effects on the economy-
wide levels of innovation.  They may however have significant effects on the relative 
profitability of innovations across industries. 
In addition to the features of patent laws, other country characteristics, such as levels of 
development and the size of domestic markets, are likely to influence levels and the direction of 
innovation.  Kremer (1993) and Sokoloff (1988) show that access to large markets for new goods 
increases expected profits from innovation and thus encourages innovation.  Alternatively, large 
markets for innovations may create opportunities for specialization and knowledge spillovers 
among competing firms.  Deardorff (1992) and Helpman (1993) argue that the effects of patent 
laws vary between developing and industrialized countries and that patent laws, which work well 
in industrialized countries, may prove detrimental to developing economies.  In contrast, Diwan 
and Rodrik (1991) demonstrate that strong patent laws can be beneficial for developing countries 
if they encourage technologies that differ from those invented in developed countries.  My paper 
uses world’s fair data from 1851 and 1876 to examine whether nineteenth-century patent laws 
influenced the direction of technological change for countries in the early stages of their 
industrialization.  
 
II. The Data  
From the catalogues of the Crystal Palace Exhibition in London in 1851 and the 
American Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876 I have constructed a new,   16
internationally comparable data set on nineteenth-century innovation.
16  More than six million 
people visited the Crystal Palace and almost ten million attended the Centennial Exhibition (see 
Kroker, 1975 p. 146).  A total of 17,062 exhibitors from 25 countries and 15 colonies displayed 
their innovations at the Crystal Palace; 30,864 exhibitors from 35 countries participated in the 
U.S. Centennial (see Bericht III, 1853 p. 674; Kretschmer, 1999 p. 101).  In 1851, the Crystal 
Palace was the largest enclosed space on earth; its exhibition halls covered 772,784 square feet, 
an area four times that of St. Peter’s in Rome, or six times that of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London.  
In 1876, a visitor at the Centennial Exhibition had to walk 22 miles to see the exhibits in all six 
principal Exhibition buildings. 
A typical entry in the exhibition catalogues includes a brief description of the exhibited 
innovation as well as the name and the home location of its presenter.  For example, consider 
Britain’s exhibit number 32 in class 9 of J. Bendall from Woodbridge, England:   
 
32 Bendall, J. Woodbridge, Manu. – A universal self-adjusting cultivator, for skimming, cleaning, 
pulverizing, or subsoiling land: pat.  
 
 
This exhibit is classified in the Crystal Palace industry class number 9, “Agricultural and 
Horticultural Machines and Implements” and in the Centennial class 670, “Agricultural 
Machinery and Instruments for Tillage.”  For the Crystal Palace data, a total of 13,876 such 
exhibits have been classified according to 30 industry classes.  For the Centennial data, I have 
counted 19,076 exhibits in 344 industry classes.  I have been able to match all Centennial classes 
                                                           
16 These fairs have the highest quality of data.  Participation in the two most promising alternatives, the 1873 
Weltausstellung in Vienna and the 1889 International Exposition in Paris suffered from political turmoil that had 
arisen among participating countries.   17
to Crystal Palace classes except for categories of innovations that were new to the later 
exhibition.
17 
Among the major benefits of the exhibition data is that the exhibits cover innovations 
from all industries.  Industry classes span the entire spectrum of production: they range from 
mining and minerals, chemicals, and food processing, to engines, manufacturing machinery, 
scientific instruments, and art.  Such coverage has been difficult to attain with historical patent 
data; patented inventions are classified by functional principles, and often cannot be assigned to 
a specific industry of use.
18  For example, studies of historical patent counts have been unable to 
classify important innovations such as power plant inventions, electric motors, or bearings 
(Schmookler, 1972 p. 89).  Moreover, economy-wide patent data are not available for countries 
that exclude specific industries from patent protection.  In the nineteenth century, Austria, 
Belgium, France, and Saxony exclude certain industries from patent protection, namely 
chemicals, foods, and medicines (Coryton, 1855 pp. 241, 244, 249, 266).   
  Based on the original classification scheme of the 1851 catalogue, I combine the 
exhibition data from thirty into seven industry classes: “mineral products”, “chemicals”, “food”, 
“machinery”, “scientific instruments, “textiles”, and “manufactures”.  This classification avoids 
the problem of treating equally a choice between “woolens” and “flax” (closely related industries 
in the textiles sector), and a choice between “woolens” and “scientific instruments” (textiles and 
machinery).  It also increases the number of exhibits in each class and thereby avoids the 
problem that classes with exceptionally small numbers of exhibits receive a disproportional 
weight in tests of the equality of distributions. 
                                                           
17 New Centennial classes were systems of education, other institutions and organizations, marine mammals (live, 
stuffed, and salted), and ornamental trees.   18
A uniform system of selecting exhibits ensured that all participating countries chose 
exhibits according to the same criteria of novelty and usefulness.  National governments valued 
the exhibitions to showcase their technologies, and often competed to demonstrate their technical 
supremacy in a certain industry (The Times, October 20, 1849).  A comprehensive system of 
reviews by local and national commissions was created to ensure that a country’s cutting-edge 
technologies were presented at the fairs.  This combination of national and local commissions 
guaranteed that innovations from both urban and rural areas were exhibited.  National 
commissions delegated the authority to select exhibits to local branch commissions.  For 
example, Britain’s national commission for the Crystal Palace nominated 65 local commissions 
to select exhibits.  Local commissions typically consisted of two to 10 academics and business 
people, representing the area’s main industries (Bericht, 1852 pp. 37 and 90).  In their 
applications to the local commissions, all potential exhibitors were required to report “what is 
novel and important about the product, how its production shows special skillfulness and proves 
an original approach” (Bericht, 1853 pp. 50 and 117).  Exhibitors had to cover transportation 
costs only to these local collection points.  After local commissions had selected their exhibits, 
national commissions checked that no local commission contributed two identical products 
(Bericht, 1853 pp. 40 and 64).  Awards to the most innovative exhibits served to enforce the 
selection of exhibits at the fairs.  No participant could excuse himself from the juror’s 
evaluation.  Signs such as “Not entered in the competition” were explicitly prohibited.  A general 
ban on price tags was intended to prevent competition through price rather than novelty (Bericht, 
1853 pp. 29, 50, 98 and 111). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 To recall a famous example, the functional class “dispensing liquids” includes holy water dispensers along with 
water pistols, while “dispensing solid” groups tooth paste tubes with manure spreaders.  See Schmookler (1972 p. 
88).     19
Exhibition data are an invaluable complement to patent data because they measure 
innovations – economically useful applications of new technologies – rather than inventions, as 
do patent data.  Exhibits satisfy a stronger test of practicality than other measures of innovation, 
because exhibits were selected for usefulness along with inventiveness and because exhibitors 
typically hoped to sell their innovations at the fairs.
19  For the twentieth century, firm-level 
surveys have found that only between 5 to 20 percent of patents become economically useful 
innovations (Meinhardt, 1950 p. 256).  In the nineteenth century, utility often was often not even 
required for a patent grant.
20 
Another benefit of exhibition data is that they include awards as a proxy for the quality of 
innovation.  Griliches (1990 p. 1669) observes that patented inventions differ greatly in quality 
and in the magnitude of inventive output associated with them.  Trajtenberg (1990) addresses 
this problem by constructing measures of the value of patented inventions based on the number 
of succeeding patents that refer to them.  However, citation measures are difficult to collect and 
not as yet available to measure the quality of nineteenth-century inventions.
21  In contrast, 
reliable proxies for quality can be created with relative ease from the records of the world fairs.  
At both exhibitions, international panels of industry experts evaluated all exhibits according to 
criteria of novelty and usefulness and awarded medals to the exhibits that they considered most 
inventive and useful.  Panels were between 6 and 12 people strong and membership was divided 
equally among university professors, representatives of professional organizations, and 
businessmen.  At the Crystal Palace, 5,438 exhibits received awards (Bericht III, 1853 p. 707; 
                                                           
19 For a comprehensive review of the costs of exhibiting see Haltern (1971). 
20 For example, Coryton (1855 pp. 235 and 239).  Brown and Jeffcott (1932) compile amusing if slightly 
unexpected “mad inventions” from the records of the United States Patent Office. Among them are “a novel device 
for automatically effecting polite salutations by the elevation and rotation of the hat” and an air-cooled rocking chair 
(No. 562,908, patented March 10, 1896, and No. 92,379, patented July 6, 1869).   
21 Currently the 1920s are the earliest period when citation data are available (Nicholas, forthcoming).   20
Haltern, 1971 p.155).  Juries awarded Council Medals, the highest honor, to the most innovative 
exhibits, Prize Medals to the second-most innovative exhibits, and Honorable Mentions to 
exhibits that they deemed impressive but not outstanding.  One percent of all exhibits received 
Council Medals, the highest honor for inventiveness, 18 percent received Prize Medals, the 
second-highest honor, and 12 percent received Honorable Mentions.  
In this paper I include data on exhibits from Austria, Bavaria, Belgium, Britain, 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, Prussia, Saxony, Switzerland, and 
Württenberg.  Data from these Northern European countries add to 11,610 exhibits in 1851 and 
close to 6,482 in 1876.  Although my data include more than 18,000 exhibits from Northern 
Europe, country characteristics are the only source of variation.  From this point of view, the 
relevant number of observations equals the number of countries times the number of industry 
categories.  I have exhibition data for 22 counties in 1851 and 1876 combined.  These data are 
divided into seven industry categories.  Then, the number of observations in my data set is 154.  
I restrict the analysis to Northern Europe because I can check the selection process for these 
countries most carefully and because they are similar in characteristics that I cannot control for, 
such as climate, culture, and religious beliefs.  At the same time, these countries vary 
considerably in the characteristics of their patent systems.  
 
A. Information on Nineteenth-century Patent Laws  
Detailed data on nineteenth-century patent laws allow me to study the effects of patent 
laws on exhibited innovations.  For states whose borders are comparable between 1850 and 
today I use Lerner’s (2000, 2002) data on patent laws.  His data, constructed from inventors’ 
manuals on patenting in foreign countries, proceed in twenty-five year intervals that include   21
1850 and 1875.
22  For states with border changes, such as pre-unification Germany, I obtain 
information from inventors’ guides to international patent laws by Godson (1840), Kingsley and 
Pirsson (1848), and Coryton (1855).  I make this distinction because countries that are unified 
today often had widely divergent patent laws in the mid-nineteenth century.  Within Germany, 
patent lengths varied from 10 years in Württenberg to 15 years and “prolonged at pleasure” in 
Bavaria.  At the same time, Württenberg’s patent officers demanded 20 times as much as their 
Prussian counterparts to be compensated for processing a grant.
 
The variable “patent length” is defined as the maximal duration of the patent, which 
inventors can be granted at the time of application.
23  For countries without patent laws, I record 
patent length to equal zero.  Denmark, a country which offered only rudimentary protection to 
certain types of manufacturing processes, is recorded as having patent length zero.  Other 
countries with zero patent length are Switzerland, which did not adopt its patent laws until the 
20
th century, and the Netherlands after they abolished patent laws in 1869 (Coryton, 1855 pp. 
245, 260). 
Plots of the patent length variable reveal that patent length clusters around a few values 
rather than being continuous.  To account for the discrete nature of these data, I divide patent 
length into three categories: no patents, short patents, and long patents.  I follow studies of 
twentieth-century patent renewal data such as Pakes (1986), who chose 10 years as the cutoff 
point to distinguish short and long patents.  Two countries are without patent laws in both 1851 
and 1876; one country has short patent grants in 1851 but three have short patents in 1876.    
 
                                                           
22 Lerner’s sample includes the sixty countries with the highest gross domestic product in 1997 as they were listed 
in the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.   22
B. Data on Other Country Characteristics   
To account for the influence of a country’s size and other characteristics, I include data 
on population, GDP, education, and the share of labor in agriculture.  I use data from the 
Annuaire Statistique (1916) and from Maddison (1995, 2002) on gross domestic product (GDP) 
and population in 1850 and 1875.  Nineteenth-century data on country characteristics are 
relatively sparse, especially for 1850.  For this year, I do not have separate GDP data for 
Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, and Württenberg.  I proxy such data by multiplying population figures 
from the Annuaire Statistique with German GDP per capita as reported in Maddison (1995, 
2002).   
There are no Swiss GDP data for 1851 or 1876; data on Swiss GDP is available only for 
1870 and 1899 (Maddison, 1995 p. 182).  I use Swiss GDP in 1870 to proxy GDP in 1875 and 
extrapolate a value for 1850 based on Swiss GDP in 1870 and 1899.
24  These estimates are crude 
and, for this reason, I repeat all tests excluding them.  From Mitchell (1998) I draw data on 
shares of GDP and of male labor employed in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry.
25  Mitchell has 
observations on GDP shares for 10, and observations on labor shares for 18 of the 24 countries in 
my data set.  Data for shares of agriculture are missing for Switzerland and Russia in both years 
and for Germany in 1851.  I extrapolate these data and repeat all regressions including shares of 
agriculture.  I also include data on total numbers of students enrolled in primary education and 
primary-school students per 1,000 children ages 5 to 14 from Lindert (2001).  Such data are 
available for 16 of my 22 country observations.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
23 I assume that awards occur very shortly after the application.  This assumption is consistent with the way in which 
data on patent fees in Lerner (2000) are constructed but it ignores differences in the fee structure for patent lengths 
below the maximal duration of the grant.  
24 Swiss GDP in 1850 is approximated linearly from values for 1870 and 1899.   23
III. Using Exhibition Data to Examine the Effects of Patent Laws  
This section uses the exhibition data to test the predictions presented in section II.  The 
first part examines the effects of patent laws on levels of innovations; the second checks for 
effects of patent laws on the direction of innovative activity. 
 
A. Effects on the  Number of Innovations 
Previous literature on patent laws has assumed that increases in patent length at any level 
motivate increases in the quantity of innovations.  However, innovating firms in countries 
without patent laws may be able to rely on alternative means to protect their intellectual 
property, and they may benefit from the freedom of adopting foreign inventions that the absence 
of patent laws affords.  If patentable domestic inventions are the only means to achieve 
innovation, countries without patent laws should bring few innovations to the fairs. On the other 
hand, if foreign inventions and domestic inventions without patent grants also lead to innovation, 
then countries without patent laws should display many innovations at the fairs.  
Plots of exhibition data, such as Figure 1, suggest that exhibits per capita are independent 
of patent lengths.  Switzerland, a country that did not adopt patent laws until 1907, exhibited the 
second largest number of innovations per capita (110 exhibits), after Belgium (117 exhibits).
26  
Denmark, the other country without patent laws, contributed 37 exhibits per capita, the median 
number of exhibits.  The coefficients of linear correlation between patent length and exhibits per 
capita are negative 0.0531 for data from both exhibitions and positive 0.1556 for the Crystal 
Palace only.  Comparisons of medal recipients across countries yield similar results.  With 0.8 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 I use “male” rather than total labor because the counting of female labor varies across countries. 
26 Exhibits per capita measure total exhibits at the Crystal Palace per million inhabitants in 1851.     24
Council Medals per million people, Switzerland has the third highest share of awards per capita 
among all participating countries. 
Regressions of exhibits on country characteristics yield some evidence against the 
hypothesis that patent laws raise the levels of innovation.  Table 4 reports the results of negative 
binomial regressions of the total number of exhibits on country characteristics.  I use negative 
binomial regressions instead of ordinary least squares because data for the dependent variable 
“numbers of exhibits” are counts and the distribution of these counts is skewed to the left.  
Negative binomial are preferable to Poisson regressions because the data are overdispersed:  
Log-likelihood ratio tests in the second to last row in Table 4 confirm that the variance of the 
dependent variable exceeds its mean.
27  The coefficients in column (1) suggest that countries 
without patent laws or with short patent grants exhibit fewer innovations than countries with 
long patent lives.  However results in columns (2) to (4) indicate that other country 
characteristics, such as population and the status as a host country, are better predictors for the 
number of exhibited innovations.  Similar results hold when the dependent variable includes 
award-winners only; the positive effects of patent laws disappear as I control for population.
28  
All results are robust to the inclusion of variables for education, geographical distance to the 
exhibitions, and labor shares in agriculture.   
  Both data plots and regression results suggest that countries without patent laws were 
able to bring forth a considerable number of innovations, despite possibly weaker incentives for 
domestic invention.  For Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, the benefits of not having 
                                                           
27 In the Poisson regression model the dependent variable yi has mean and variance µ i = exp (xi’β ). The negative 
binomial model generalizes the variance function to V [yi |xi] = µ i + αµ i, where the parameter α  measures dispersion 
around the mean.  For descriptions of the Poisson and negative binomial models see Cameron and Trivedi (1998 pp. 
70-85) or Hausmann, Hall and Griliches (1984). 
28 I have repeated all tests with an alternative measure of patent length: patent length with extensions, which takes 
account of differences in the ability to renew a patent.  All results are similar.   25
patent laws (particularly the ability to legally copy foreign inventions) appear to have neutralized 
the negative effects on the incentives for domestic invention.  Two caveats apply.  First, 
exhibition data may be an imperfect measure of innovation, because the number of exhibits may 
be biased by other country characteristics such as country size or economic strength.  My 
regressions include controls such as population, GDP, levels of education, and shares of 
employment in agriculture, but some omitted variable bias might remain.  All countries without 
patent laws are small and this may be why including population reduces the statistical 
significance of patent laws.  Second, although the theoretical and empirical literature on 
innovation has emphasized the effects of patent lengths, other features of patent systems, such as 
the breadth of patent grants and inventors’ expectations about the enforcement of patent grants 
may be equally important.  Nonetheless, even the most cautious interpretation of the data 
confirms that mechanisms other than patent protection must have existed to protect intellectual 
property and that the absence of patent laws did not unambiguously hinder innovation in 
countries without patent laws.  Innovators in countries without patent laws found ways to 
mitigate the disadvantages of their position, possibly by focusing on industries that relied less on 
patent laws.  
 
B. Effects on the Direction of Innovative Activity 
A major benefit of exhibition data is that they enable us to study the effects of patent 
laws on the direction of innovation.  Exhibition data are the first source of comprehensive data 
on innovation in all of a country’s industries.  To the best of my knowledge, there are no 
alternative sources of economy-wide data on innovation which are comparable across countries.    26
I use the exhibition data to investigate how country characteristics, and specifically patent laws, 
influence inventors’ choice of industry and thus the direction of innovative activity.   
If patent laws influence the direction of innovative activity in the way that I outlined in 
section II, the distribution of innovations across industries should differ strongly across countries 
with widely divergent patent laws.  In contrast, the distributions of innovations across industries 
should be similar across countries with identical patent lengths.  Chi-square tests of homogeneity 
suggest that differences in the direction of innovation increase with patent length.  Distributions 
of exhibits from countries with long-lived patents are more different from each other than are 
distributions from countries with short-lived patent grants.  One plausible explanation for this 
fact is that changes in patent length have little effect if patents are long-lived because 
innovations become obsolete prior to the expiration of the patent grant.  Schankerman and 
Pakes’ (1986) finding that only 10 percent of European inventions in the second half of the 
nineteenth century survive for the whole statutory term lends support to this hypothesis.  If the 
lifetime of patent grants exceeds the natural lifetime of innovations, other determinants of 
innovation may outweigh the influence of patent laws and create differences in the direction of 
innovations across countries. 
In contrast, countries with short patent grants and those without patent laws patent laws 
are more similar to each other than countries with long patent grants.  In Figures 2 and 3, 
histograms of exhibits at the Crystal Palace reveal that distributions of exhibits across industries 
are remarkably similar for the two patentless countries in 1851: Switzerland and Denmark.  Chi-
square tests of homogeneity fail to reject the hypothesis that the distribution of exhibits across 
industries is identical for Switzerland and Denmark.  For eight categories, the chi-square statistic 
is 6.37 including art and 5.01 excluding art, both of which are significant at the five percent   27
level.  Differences in the natural endowments between landlocked, mountainous Switzerland and 
sea-swept Denmark make these similarities in the direction of innovation even more remarkable. 
Within machinery, the countries without patent laws reveal a striking resemblance in 
their focus on scientific instruments.  Figure 3 shows that both countries allocate about one 
fourth of their total exhibits to this category, which includes optical instruments and watches 
along with instruments for scientific measurement, thermometers, theodolites, and barometers.  
At customary significance levels, the chi-square statistic of 7.82 fails to reject the hypothesis that 
the distributions of Swiss and Danish exhibits across machinery are identical.  Twenty-seven 
percent of Switzerland’s exhibits and 23 percent of Denmark’s exhibits at the Crystal Palace are 
of scientific instruments. 
No other country has comparable shares of innovations in scientific instruments.  Figure 
4 shows that only eight percent of Britain’s exhibits are in instruments.  Britain, as the most 
developed country in 1851, devotes a significantly smaller portion of her innovations to this 
nineteenth-century, cutting-edge industry.  Britain’s share equals the mean across all countries, 
and slightly exceeds the median of six percent.  Bavaria, where patents last up to 15 years, has 
the third highest share: 14 percent of her exhibits are in instruments.  France, where patents last 
15 years, and Württenberg, where patents last ten years, each devote 10 percent of their 
innovations to scientific instruments.  In comparison, American patents last 14 years, and only 
13 percent of American exhibits are in scientific instruments.  
In the following paragraphs I use data from both exhibitions in multinomial regressions 
to check more rigorously how patent laws influence the direction of innovation.  Experiment j is 
to draw a count from the exhibition records for country j and determine the industry it belongs 
to.  For example, I draw an exhibit from the exhibition data for Germany and determine whether   28
it belongs to “mining and metals”, “chemicals”, “food”, “machinery”, “scientific instruments”, 
“textiles”, or “manufactures”.  Clearly the outcomes of these experiments are mutually exclusive, 
and therefore the probabilities that counts fall within a specific subclass add to one.  I make the 
strong (but not implausible) assumption that draws for the 22 country observations in 1851 and 
1876 constitute experiments that are independent of each other.  Under these conditions, the data 
represent independent draws from a multinomial distribution.  Let π i (xij) denote the probability 
that an exhibit in country j occurs in industry i (where i =  “mining”, 
“chemicals”…”manufactures”) at values of k explanatory variables xj = (1, xj“no patent laws”, xj“short 
patent grants”, xjlog (population), xjgdp per capita, …). Then,   
 
π i (xij) = exp (α i + β ixj) / [exp (α mining+ β miningxj) +… +exp (α manufactures + β manufacturesxj)].   
 
One pair of coefficients is redundant.  I set α manufactures = β manufactures = 0 for the largest industry 
class, which is manufacturing.  I use multinomial logit regressions to estimate values for these 
coefficients and to calculate predictions (according to the equation above) for industry shares 
under different types of patent systems.  This method fits the multinomial logit model by 
maximizing the likelihood subject to simultaneously satisfying the six equations that satisfy the 
model (seven industry categories minus one).  Alternatively, I have fitted logit models separately 
for the six pairings of responses.  Parameter estimates obtained in separate fitting of logit models 
are less efficient than those obtained by simultaneously fitting the multinomial logit, especially 
when the probability of being classified in the omitted (baseline) category is small.  I omit 
“manufactured goods”, because it is the largest class. 
I divide the data into two separate samples and run regressions with different sets of 
country characteristics.  To assess changes over time, I analyze data from the Crystal Palace and   29
the Centennial separately as well as jointly.  This division avoids the problem that the 
distribution of exhibits for a given country in 1876 is not independent from the distribution of 
exhibits for the same country in 1851.  Regressions control for country size through logarithms 
of population and for levels of development through GDP per capita.  I have repeated all 
regressions excluding GDP and population and found all results robust to those changes.  I have 
also replicated all tests with information on all countries for which I have data, including Russia, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Canada, and the United States. 
Multinomial regressions of exhibition data indicate that patent laws help to determine the 
direction of innovative activity.  Coefficient values in Table 5 and predicted values in Table 6 
confirm that countries without patent laws have significantly larger shares of innovation in 
scientific instruments than do other countries.  Countries without patent laws also have 
significantly smaller shares in manufactures and somewhat smaller shares in machinery and 
manufactures.  In the period between the two exhibitions, the focus of innovation shifted away 
from textiles, scientific instruments, and manufacture.  For countries without patent systems, the 
share of textiles did not fall as rapidly.  In contrast, the decline in manufactures was pronounced.  
Innovation in countries without patent systems became more concentrated on food processing.  
At the same time, innovation became distributed more evenly in countries that had patent 
systems.  Strong patterns of concentration within economies disappeared and patterns of 
innovation became more similar to each other across countries.   
For countries without patent laws, predicted shares of innovations in scientific 
instruments are significantly higher than for other countries.  Patentless countries have almost 
one fourth of their exhibits in scientific instruments, while other countries have less than one 
fifteenth of their exhibits in instruments.  This difference is larger at the earlier exhibition:  In   30
1851, 28 percent of all exhibited innovations from patentless countries are in scientific 
instruments compared to eight percent for other countries.  Figure 5 illustrates predicted shares 
for the smallest industry classes in 1851 and 1876.  It shows that the share of scientific 
instruments declines between 1851 and 1876 but continues to be greater for countries without 
patent laws.  In Figure 5b shares for 1876 are 19 and 6 percent, respectively.
29 
Countries without patent laws also have larger proportions of their innovations in food 
processing.  In 1851, most innovations in food processing are new methods of preservation; in 
1876, instant meals, such as beef extracts, and mass-produced foodstuffs, such as margarine, 
have become more prominent.  In regressions with data from both exhibitions, the predicted 
shares for foods are 13.5 percent for countries without patent laws and 9 percent for countries 
with patent laws.  Similarly, predicted values for countries with short and long patent grants 
indicate that countries with short patent grants have significantly higher proportions in food than 
those with long patent grants. In 1851, innovations in foodstuffs have shares of about two 
percent in countries without patent laws and four percent in other countries.  By 1876, the share 
of foodstuffs has risen to about one quarter for countries without patent laws and to nearly 16 
percent for countries with patent laws.  
The Netherlands, which for political reasons abandoned her patent system in 1869, 
experienced a strong shift towards food processing after this change in patent laws (see Penrose, 
1951).  The proportion of Dutch innovations that were devoted to food processing increased 
from 11 to 36 percent between 1851 and 1876, replacing textiles as the most prominent industry 
for Dutch innovations.   
                                                           
29 These results are robust to changes in the definition of “short patents”.  They do not change if patent length is 
included as a continuous or squared variable.  I have also repeated all tests controlling for shares of agriculture and 
various measures of education, though such data are sparse until the 1870s.    31
Countries without patent laws also have significantly lower proportions of their exhibits 
in the class “mining and mineral products.”  This difference may be a result of resource 
endowments rather than differences in patent laws.  In the nineteenth century, patenting played a 
crucial role in protecting innovations in machinery for resource extraction.  For example, Beatty 
(1996) finds that mining and metallurgy were the most frequent industry categories among 
nineteenth-century patents in Mexico (p. 155).  However, Switzerland, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands lack good deposits of iron and coal along with the protection of a patent system.
30  
Their inadequate resource endowments offer a compelling alternative explanation for the paucity 
of innovations in these industries.  To account for this possibility, I omit mining and metallurgy 
from the regressions.  This does not change the coefficient values for other categories.
31  
Predicted industry shares, which are represented in Figure 5 suggest that the existence of 
domestic patent laws mattered more in 1851 than it did in 1876.  In 1851, the emphasis on 
scientific instruments in countries without patent laws is striking.  By 1876, differences in 
distribution are still significant, but both types of countries have shifted innovations towards 
similar industries, albeit to varying degrees.  A likelihood ratio test statistic of 122.4 rejects the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on patent laws and other country characteristics are identical 
between 1851 and 1876.
32  This is consistent with the results of studies of the history of patent 
laws such as Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999) who suggest a strengthening of international 
markets for patent protection towards the turn of the nineteenth century.  Data in these studies, as 
well as Lerner (2000) indicate that the level of discrimination against foreign patentees 
                                                           
30 For an example of a country study that treats resource endowments see Schiff (1971).  The Netherlands, for 
instance had no ore, and only limited coal deposits. (Schiff, 1971 p. 35)   
31 The Hausmann-McFadden test statistic for IIA is 6.65.  
32 The likelihood ratio test statistic is -2(lnLpooled -(lnL1851 + lnL1876) = 122.24.  Degrees of freedom are equal to the 
sum of the parameters in the separate regressions for 1851 and 1876 minus the number of parameters in the pooled   32
decreased over the course of the nineteenth century.   Although further evidence is necessary, I 
would cautiously argue that the importance of domestic patent laws decreased with 
improvements in international markets for patent protection.   
Population and GDP per capita are other important influences on the distribution of 
innovative activity across industries.  The logarithm of population is significant in all 
specifications.  Likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis that country size has no effect on the 
distribution of innovation across industries.  These results confirm the arguments of Sokoloff 
(1988) and Kremer (1993) that population and the size of the domestic market influence 
innovation.  In contrast to previous work, which has focused on levels of innovation, I find that 
country size also influences the direction of innovation.  Size may allow large economies to 
develop innovative capacity in sectors where innovations depend on large scale to be profitable. 
In industries where alternative mechanisms are effective relative to patent protection, 
smaller shares of exhibits should refer to patents.  Moser (2003) uses British exhibition data to 
construct a proxy for the proportion of innovations that are patented across industries and 
geographic locations.  This proxy is calculated as the number of exhibits that refer to a patent 
divided by the total number of exhibits.  It would be a perfect measure of patenting rates if 
exhibitors listed patents if and only if they held patent grants.  As an approximation, this 
assumption seems plausible: exhibitors with patents advertise their patents to raise the value of 
their innovations; exhibitors without patents are unlikely to claim patents, because they would be 
discovered easily. 
Patenting rates for British exhibits vary between 5 and 38 percent across industries.  Less 
than five percent of innovations in mining and metallurgy refer to patent grants, compared to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regression.  Degrees of freedom are 3 (4 plus 5 minus 6) and the critical value of the chi-square distribution at 5   33
almost 39 percent of innovations in manufacturing machinery.  In scientific instruments, less 
than nine percent of innovations appear to be patented.  This share is astonishingly small given 
the prominent position of scientific instruments at this time.   In food, less than 10 percent of 
innovations are patented.   At the same time, almost every fourth innovation in machinery refers 
to a patent.  The proportion of patented innovation is highest in manufacturing machinery, with 
more than 38 percent, and in engines (29 percent) and agricultural machinery (23 percent). 
Comparisons of patenting rates across industries confirm that patent protection is 
relatively less important in scientific instruments and food processing, key industries on which 
inventors in countries without patent laws focus innovation.  In the next section, I summarize 
narrative evidence from nineteenth-century sources which confirms that secrecy was important 
in scientific instruments and food processing 
 
IV. The Use of Secrecy in Scientific Instruments and Food Processing   
Narrative evidence confirms that secrecy was widely used to protect innovations in 
scientific instruments and food processing.  For example, the report of the German Crystal 
Palace Commission describes how 12 industry experts unsuccessfully attempted to reconstruct 
the watch springs invented by F. Lutz of Switzerland.  Similarly, the Commission reports relate 
that Dutch and Swiss inventions in optical instruments, such as the rectangular prisms of Swiss 
glassmaker T. Daguet of Soleure, or Danish barometers and surgical instruments, proved 
impossible to reverse-engineer (Bericht I, 1852 pp. 813, 819, 930, and 941).   
Jaquet and Chapuis (1945) relate many instances when Swiss watchmakers went through 
great troubles to keep new production processes secret.  For example: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
percent significance is 7.81.   34
Many of Geneva’s watchmakers – Lovousy, Latard, Boureaux, Geneqund, Girod, Bagan, Boinche, to 
name a few – employed their own inventions of new tools, which they did not allow anybody to see.  




Another group of watchmakers in the Valleé de Joux, who shared the secret of the “sonnerie des 
minutes” – measuring minutes, entered into a verbal agreement not to take any apprentices in 
order to protect their inventions from imitation.  They succeeded in honoring this agreement 
from 1823 to 1840 (see Jaquet and Chapuis, 1945 p. 165).  
In food processing, the history of margarine illustrates the relative effectiveness of 
secrecy.  Margarine first turned profitable in the Netherlands, at a time when this country did not 
have patent laws.  Two Dutch firms, Jurgens and Van den Bergh, began to manufacture 
margarine in 1871, after the original patent holder, a French chemist by the name Mège Mouriès, 
willingly described how margarine could be made, considering himself protected by his 1869 
French patent.  Trade secrets protected future improvements: When the Van den Bergh factory 
succeeded in producing a new and less repulsive type of margarine, they kept this innovation 
secret.  As late as 1905, long after the original patent would have expired, the Jurgens firm had 
not succeeded in reverse engineering by chemical analysis or by efforts to obtain information 
from his rival’s workers.  Many other important innovations in food processing originated in late 
nineteenth-century Switzerland: milk chocolate, liquid soup seasoning, bouillon, and baby food 
(see Schiff, 1971 pp. 54-58, 111-112).   
 
V.  Potential Sources of Bias and Endogeneity   
One common problem with analyzing the effects of patent laws is that patent laws may 
be endogenous to innovation.  Anecdotal evidence for the late nineteenth and for the twentieth 
                                                           
33 Jaquet and Chapuis (1945 p.170), my translation.  See Landes (1983) for further examples.    35
century suggests that a country’s choice of patent laws was often influenced by the nature of her 
technologies.  In the 1880s, for example, two of Switzerland’s most important industries – 
chemicals and textiles – were strongly opposed to the introduction of a patent system, as it would 
restrict their use of processes developed abroad.  When Switzerland adopted her first patent laws, 
the Swiss laws excluded inventions which could not be represented by a model or physical 
replica, effectively excluding all inventions in dyeing and chemical processes (see Penrose, 1951 
p. 16; Schiff, 1971 pp. 86, 92). 
However, endogeneity appears to be a much smaller problem in the mid-nineteenth 
century than in any other period.  Historical records suggest that early patent laws were 
determined by cultural and political factors rather than by the nature of technologies.  Table 2 
shows that most European countries adopted their patent systems well before 1851 (for data, see 
Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Penrose, 1951; Machlup, 1958).  Early patent laws appear to have 
evolved with little planning or concern for existing clusters of innovation: “The patent system as 
it stands today has to a considerable extent ‘just grow(n)’ without much reference to fundamental 
principles, escaping the social planning of men into unexpected byways …” (Penrose, 1951 p. 
19).  Lerner (2000) argues that key characteristics of patent laws across 60 countries from 1850 
to 1990 are best explained by political systems and legal tradition: Countries with democratic 
institutions are more likely to have patent protection and they grant longer-lived awards. 
A related concern is that Switzerland’s focus on scientific instruments was a result of 
historical accidents or, as has been proposed, Switzerland’s mountainous terrain, and had 
nothing to do with patent laws.  This is unlikely because, although the beginnings of the Swiss 
watch-making industry can be traced back to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, 
Switzerland became a prominent seat of watch-making only in the second quarter of the   36
nineteenth century.  In earlier years, Paris and London had been the centers of European watch-
making and prominent Swiss watchmakers were active in both of these foreign cities, rather than 
in their home country (Jaquet and Chapuis, 1945 p. 123).  As late as the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century, unemployment among Swiss watchmakers in the Jura was so high that local 
authorities attempted to retrain watchmakers for other professions.  It was only towards the mid-
nineteenth century that Switzerland came into her own as a center of watch-making.  At that 
time, most of the growth occurred outside of Geneva, in towns where watch-making was a 
relatively new trade, such as Bern, Neufchatel, and Fribourg (see Landes, 1983 pp. 275-289). 
In addition to endogeneity and heterogeneity that is unrelated to patent laws, one needs to 
consider potential sources of bias in the way in which exhibition data measure innovation.  In 
general, bias appears to be a lesser problem for measuring the distribution rather than the 
absolute number of innovations.  One potential source of bias for the number of innovations is 
that Britain’s Central Commission allocated space to individual countries according to their own 
perception of a country’s relative importance as an innovator.  But these restrictions on space do 
not appear too stringent.  Visiting countries could request larger allocations or construct 
additional buildings to house their exhibits.
34  When the United States Commission to the Crystal 
Palace thought that U.S. exhibitors would be short on space, it asked the British Commission for 
more room and was granted its request (Haltern, 1971 p.150).  Floor plans for the Centennial 
exhibition show that countries built additional exhibition spaces on the Centennial grounds: 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Morocco, Spain, Sweden, and 
                                                           
34 Local commissions asked potential exhibitors to include space requirements in their applications  (Bericht, 1852 
p.35).  If it was harder for large exhibits to be accepted, large exhibits may be more innovative.  To check this, I 
have calculated the floor space per exhibitor for each of the 30 industry classes at the Crystal Palace.  By this 
measure, exhibits of agricultural machinery and machines for direct use would be most innovative because they 
took 91 and 95 square feet of floor space compared to an average of 28.5.  On the other hand, judging inventiveness   37
Turkey constructed cheap and temporary structures to house additional exhibits.
35  To address 
potential distortions that remain, I control for country size and analyze distributions of exhibits, 
by dividing exhibits in each industry by the total number of exhibits.  
Exhibition data may underreport technological innovations that are easy to imitate or 
reverse-engineer, if such innovations were not exhibited for fear of imitation.  Contemporary 
records indicate that this fear of copying was a more serious concern if the host country to the 
exhibition did not have patent laws.  Yet even in these countries only a few exhibitors decided to 
withdraw their innovations from the fairs: 
 
In a meeting of the Central Commission for the Swiss Exposition in Lucerne, they had declared that 
they would not exhibit at Zurich unless Switzerland would adopt patent laws…It is a fact though, that, 
despite this false alarm, of the 5000 exhibitors only 50, no more than 1 percent, retracted their 
applications (Procès-verbal du Congres Suisse, 1883 p. 68).  
 
 
At the Crystal Palace, a system of registration, which was available to all exhibitors, acted as a 
cheap and fast patent system; only 500 of 13,750 exhibitors took advantage of it (see Bericht III, 
1853 pp. 697-701).  
  At both fairs, exhibitors found ways to advertise their innovations without disclosing the 
secrets of their inventions.  Rather than exhibiting a new piece of machinery, or describing a new 
process, many exhibitors displayed samples of their final output.  For example, Drewsen & Sons 
of Silkeborg, Jutland, exhibited “Specimens of paper, glazed by a machine constructed by the 
exhibitor”, instead of his papermaking machine, which he kept secret (see Official Catalogue, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by floor space implies that china, porcelain and earthenware are significantly more innovative than chemical 
exhibits, which seems unreasonable.   
35 Visitor’s Guide (1875 p. 18).  The average number of acres per exhibitor was approximately equal at the two 
exhibitions.  It was 0.00118 in 1851 and 0.00125 in 1876.   38
First Edition, 1851 p. 210).  P. Claussen of London, an inventor and patentee, exhibited 
“Samples of flax in all its stages, from straw to cloth, prepared by the exhibitor’s process.”
36 
Heavy and fragile exhibits, which would otherwise have been under-represented due to 
transportation costs, were exhibited as models or blueprints.  Of 194 British exhibits in class 7, 
“Civil Engineering, Architecture, and Building Contrivances”, 88 exhibits, or 45 percent, were 
represented by models.  For example, T. Powell of Monmouthshire, Britain, exhibited a “Model 
for apparatus used for shipment of coals from boats or waggons at Cardiff dock”; A.Watney of 
Llanelly, Wales, exhibited “Models of anthracite blast furnaces.”
37  Among the engineering 
exhibits there was a model of the suspension bridge that was being constructed across the 
Dnieper at Kiev.  Robert and Alan Stevenson (respectively the grandfather and the uncle of 
Robert Louis Stevenson) showed models of lighthouses they had designed for the Bell Rock and 
for Skerryvore (see Rolt, 1970 p. 157).  In sum, the records indicate that exhibition data are a 
useful measure of innovation.  Bias and problems of endogeneity, to the extent that they exist, 
are unlikely to be severe enough to invalidate analyses of the effects of patent laws.  
 
VI. Conclusions  
This paper has introduced a new data set that permits an empirical investigation of the 
effects of patent laws across countries.  The data have been constructed from the catalogues of 
two nineteenth-century world fairs: the Crystal Palace Exhibition in London in 1851 and the 
Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876.  Exhibition data have revealed no evidence that 
patent laws increased levels of innovative activity, but they indicate that patent laws influenced 
                                                           
36 Official Catalogue (1851 p.28).  Some inventors even considered it safe enough to disclose production processes 
at the world fairs.  For example, a British inventor exhibited “Patent railway carriage and other axles, with 
illustrations of the processes of manufacture…” (Exhibit 543, Official catalogue, 1851 p. 33).     39
the direction of innovative activity.  The absence of patent laws appears to have guided 
innovative activity towards industries where mechanisms other than patent laws protected 
intellectual property; in the nineteenth-century, inventors in countries without patent laws 
concentrated innovation in industries where secrecy was an effective alternative to patent grants.  
Secrecy was especially effective in scientific instruments, and every fourth exhibit from 
countries without patent laws came from that industry while no more than one seventh of other 
countries' innovations were in scientific instruments.  Between 1851 and 1876, the manufacture 
of scientific instruments became mechanized.  Further progress in this industry required 
innovations in manufacturing machinery, which depended crucially on patent protection.  During 
this time, inventors in countries without patent laws began to specialize in food processing, 
another industry where secrecy was effective.  The Netherlands, where the free trade party 
succeeded to abolish patent laws in 1869, increased her share in food processing from 11 to 33 
percent after the abolition of her patent laws.  These finding suggest an important consideration 
for international patent policies:  The introduction of strong and effective patent laws in 
countries without patents may have stronger effects on changing the direction of innovative 
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Notes: Exhibits per million population in 1851 measures the total number of a country’s 
exhibits at the Crystal Palace divided by that country’s population in millions in 1851 or the 
closest of two preceding years if there are no data for 1851.  I have excluded Britain to get a 
clearer picture of the remaining countries.  Britain’s has 383 exhibits per one million 
population.  Data on population are drawn from Annuaire Statistique (1916) and Maddison 
(1995); data on patent length from Coryton (1855) and Lerner (2001). 
 
 
FIGURE 2 – DISTRIBUTION OF EXHIBITS  
ACROSS INDUSTRIES IN 1851 
 








































Notes: This classification follows the original classification of exhibits in 1851 as reported in 
Bericht (1853).   The class machinery includes scientific instruments along with engines, 
carriages, and railway equipment, manufacturing machinery, machinery for construction, as 
well as guns and other military equipment.  
FIGURE 3 – SWISS AND DANISH EXHIBITS OF DIFFERENT  
































FIGURE 4 – SHARES OF EXHIBITS IN SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS  









































Sources: Data are from Bericht (1852), Coryton (1855), and Lerner (2000).  “Share of 
instruments” measures the proportion of a country’s exhibits that occur in the industry class 
“scientific instruments.”  Patent length measures the maximum duration of a patent grant in 1851 



















































Notes: Predicted values are calculated as π i (xij) = exp (α i + β ixj) / [exp (α mining+ β miningxj) 
+… +exp (α manufactures + β manufacturesxj)] from multinomial regressions that control for the 
logarithm of population, GDP per capita, and time.  Table A2 reports the values for 
multinomial coefficients α i, and β i. The Newton-Raphson iterative maximum likelihood 















TABLE 1 – STATISTICS ON THE WORLD FAIRS OF 1851 AND 1876 
 
 EXHIBITION 
 Crystal  Palace  Centennial 































    
 
Source: Data are drawn from Bericht III (1853) and Kretschmer (1999).  Among forty 
participating countries in 1851 fifteen were British colonies.  For this paper, I have 
restricted the data set to Northern European countries because these are fairly 
homogenous in their climates, culture, and other characteristics.  Northern European 
countries include only those for which data on patent laws were available.   
Luxembourg and some smaller German states are excluded because their data are very 
spotty.  
 TABLE 2– DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT LAWS 1500 TO 1876 
 
 
1474    Venice grants monopolies of ten years to inventors of new machines 
1623    English Statute of Monopolies repeals the practice of royal monopoly  
                        grants to all except inventors. 
1790    U.S. Patent Act 
1791    The French Constitutional Assembly passes a patent law. 
1793    U.S. establishes a registration system for patent applications.  
1810    Austria enacts patent laws. 
1812    Russia enacts patent laws.  
1815    Prussia enacts patent laws.  
1817    Belgium and the Netherlands enact patent laws.  
1820    Spain enacts patent laws.  
1825    Bavaria enacts patent laws.  
1826    Sardinia enacts patent laws.  
1829  In Britain, Select Parliamentary Committees explore proposals for reforms of the patent 
system. 
1834    Sweden enacts patent laws.  
1836    Württenberg enacts patent laws. 
    U.S. adopts the system of patent examination that is still in use today. 
1843    Saxony enacts patent laws. 
1851    Crystal Palace Exhibition in London, England 
1852    The British Parliament approves the Patent Law Amendment Act. 
    The Amendment establishes a renewal system, and lowers patenting costs. 
1855-1873 Patent  Controversy 
1869    Netherlands abolish all patent laws 
1871    Harmonization of German patent laws 






TABLE 3 – COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Country Patent  Length  Population  GDP 
  1851 1876 1851 1876 1851 1876 
Austria  15  15  3,950 4,730 6,563 9,395 
Bavaria  15  - 4,521 - 6,673 - 
Belgium 15  20  4,449  5,303  8,042  14,849 
Britain 14  14  25,601  30,662  60,479  107,661 
Denmark  0  5  1,499 1,973 2,549 4,008 
France  15  15  36,350 38,221 60,685 84,014 
Germany -  15  -  24,023  -  - 
Netherlands 15 0  3,095  3,822  5,844  52,805 
Prussia  12  - 16,331 - 24,105 - 
Saxony  12  - 1,894 - 2,796 - 
Norway  &  Sweden  15  - 4,875 - 5,993 - 
Norway  -  3  - 1,803 - 2,650 
Sweden  -  3  - 4,363 - 8,006 
Switzerland  0  0  2,379 2,750 1,986 5,787 
Wurttemberg  10  - 1,745 - 2,575 - 
 
Sources: Annuaire Statistique (1916), Coryton (1855), Lerner (2000), and Maddison (1995).  Patent 
length measures the maximal duration of a patent grant.  Population and GDP data are from 
Maddison (1995), except for Switzerland and the German states in 1851.  Maddison’s GDP data are 
expressed in million 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.  Population data for Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, and 
Württenberg are drawn from the Annuaire Statistique (1916).  GDP data for the German states in 
1851 are calculated by multiplying population by the value of Germany’s GDP per capita as reported 
in Maddison (1995).  Swiss GDP in 1850 is calculated as Swiss GDP in 1870 minus 20/29 times the 
increase in GDP between 1870 and 1899.  1870 and 1899 are the earliest years for which Maddison 





TABLE 4 – NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS OF  
EXHIBITS ON COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Total  Exhibits    “Award” Exhibits 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] 

























Population (in log form)    0.98
*** 







GDP Per Capita        -0.36 
(0.32) 
 
  0.01 
(1.03) 







  1.09 
(1.12) 




















           
α   0.98 0.41 0.60 0.25 
 
1.65 0.45 












Notes: “No patent laws”, “short patent grants”, “host country”, and “Crystal Palace” are dummy variables.  Short patents are 
defined as patent lengths below 10 years. In the regressions of the total number of exhibits on country characteristics I use 
negative binomial regressions instead of ordinary least squares because the data for the dependent variable “numbers of exhibits” 
are counts and these counts are skewed to the left.  I use negative binomial instead of Poisson regressions because the data are 
overdispersed: log-likelihood ratio tests in the second to last row attest that variances are greater than means.  (In the Poisson 
regression model the dependent variable yi has mean and variance µ i = exp (xi’β ).  The negative binomial model generalizes the 
variance function to V [yi |xi] = µ i + αµ i, where the parameter α  measures dispersion around the mean.)  TABLE 5 – MULTINOMIAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS 
 
  With GDP per capita  Without GDP per capita 
  Coefficient Standard  Error Coefficient Standard  Error 
Mining and Minerals      
No patent laws  -0.7718  0.4104  -0.7587  0.4087 
Short  patent  grants  1.6885 0.1874 1.3475 0.1809 
Population in log form  -0.0923  0.0552  0.0919  0.0487 
GDP per capita  0.8013  0.0976  -  - 
Crystal Palace  0.1665  0.1066  -0.2274  0.0907 
Constant  -2.5735 0.5005 -2.3110 0.4919 
Chemicals      
No  patent  laws  0.3839 0.2666 0.4224 0.2662 
Short  patent  grants  0.4665 0.2063 0.4342 0.2024 
Population in log form  0.0612  0.0618  0.0769  0.0591 
GDP per capita  0.0837  0.1002  -  - 
Crystal  Palace  -1.5504 0.1034 -1.5854 0.0938 
Constant  -1.8051 0.5947 -1.7533 0.5924 
Food Preparations      
No  patent  laws  1.3500 0.1859 1.3236 0.1864 
Short  patent  grants  0.3808 0.1717 0.5251 0.1687 
Population in log form  0.1155  0.0515  0.0556  0.0498 
GDP per capita  -0.3603  0.0870  -  - 
Crystal  Palace  -2.0171 0.0887 -1.8623 0.0806 
Constant  -0.7475 0.4990 -1.0358 0.4995 
Machinery      
No  patent  laws  1.4138 0.1976 1.3793 0.1936 
Short  patent  grants  1.6671 0.1753 1.2102 0.1697 
Population in log form  0.3308  0.0461  0.5096  0.0419 
GDP per capita  0.8978  0.0675  -  - 
Crystal Palace  0.3704  0.0758  -0.0963  0.0647 
Constant  -6.2159 0.4477 -5.6199 0.4278 
Scientific Instruments      
No  patent  laws  2.2937 0.1733 2.3246 0.1733 
Short  patent  grants  0.2200 0.2294 0.2895 0.2275 
Population in log form  0.2494  0.0486  0.2198  0.0464 
GDP per capita  -0.1581  0.0793  -  - 
Crystal  Palace  -0.1272 0.0882 -0.0500 0.0793 
Constant  -3.3149 0.4689 -3.4223 0.4719 
Textiles      
No  patent  laws  0.9218 0.1426 0.9640 0.1422 
Short patent grants  -0.4523  0.1549  -0.3633  0.1536 
Population in log form  -0.0362  0.0295  -0.0889  0.0271 
GDP per capita  -0.2458  0.0575  -  - 
Crystal  Palace  -0.0457 0.0616 0.0672 0.0564 
Constant  0.8520 0.2723 0.7675 0.2729 
      
Exhibits 14,935  14,935 
Countries 22  22 
Countries*Industries 154  154 
Log-likelihood -24,560.13  -24,772.18 
 
 TABLE 6 – PREDICTED VALUES 
 
  Patent Laws 





  No Yes No Yes No Yes 





















































































Notes: Predicted values are calculated as π i (xij) = exp (α i  +  β ixj) / [exp (α mining+  β miningxj) +… +exp (α manufactures  + 
β manufacturesxj)] from multinomial regressions that control for the logarithm of population, GDP per capita, and time.  Table 





TABLE 7 – SHARES OF ENGLISH EXHIBITS THAT REFER TO PATENTS IN 1851 
 
Industry Class  Patenting Rates 
Mining 4.81% 
Chemicals   11.84% 
Food Processing  9.68% 
Scientific Instruments  8.63% 
Machinery 22.48% 
Engines, railways and marine mechanism  28.57% 
Manufacturing machines and tools  38.67% 
Civil engineering and architecture  14.57% 
Naval architecture and military engineering  15.54% 





Notes:  Patenting rates are calculated by dividing references to patents by the total number of exhibits in an industry. To 
ensure comparability, this information is based on data from England only.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 